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THE U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
CAMBODIA, 1975-1980
Jamie Frederic Metz

On 3 March 1978, Evan Luard, the British Under-Secretary of
State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, stepped to the
podium to address the U.N. Commission on Human Rights regarding
the situation in Cambodia. Luard, a United Nations scholar and
proponent of furthering human rights principles through foreign
policy,1 was not one to take such violations lightly. After referring to
"reports of systematic and arbitrary executions, and of other gross
violations of human rights, involving many thousands of deaths within
Democratic Kampuchea," Luard asserted that,
The facts which I have described - and they are facts
confirmed by innumerable witnesses - represent a
challenge to this Commission. The need for the allegations
to be investigated and clarified if this Commission is to do
its job is clear...
It is for the Commission on Human Rights to take
the initiative in instituting such an investigation. There is
no other body that can do so... The Commission is the
organ of the United Nations concerned with such matters
and as such bears a unique responsibility. The United
Kingdom therefore proposes that the Commission should
make a thorough study of the human rights situation in

t Harvard Law School; St Antony's College, Oxford, D. Phil, 1994; Brown
University, B.A., 1990; UNTAC Human Rights Officer, 1992-1993. The ideas
presented in this paper are further developed in the author's book WESTERN
RESPONSE TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN CAMBODIA, 1975-80, New York: St.
Martin's Press, (1996).

' See EvAN LuARD, HuMAN RIGHTS AND FOREIGN POLICY (1981).
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Cambodia.2
In many ways, Luard's statement in Geneva represented the high
point of Western human rights response to the mass abuses committed
under the Democratic Kampuchea regime (1975-1978).
Such responses had only slowly and gradually developed.
Immediately following the full American withdrawal from Vietnam
and Cambodia and the communist takeovers in Indochina in April
1975, America and its Western allies had largely turned their backs to
Indochina. One State Department official described a common attitude
of his colleagues at this time as "who cares what those f-ing Gooks
are doing."3 As an observer of United States opinion noted in 1976,
"Americans have somehow blocked [the Vietnam experience] out of
4
their consciousness..
Despite such "Vietnam fatigue" and the extreme isolation of Pol
Pot's Cambodia, allegations of mass killings in Cambodia gradually
became more accepted by the Western media and concerned observers
in the West in the years following the war. This process had begun
with Frangois Ponchaud's February 1976 articles in Le Monde
describing the human costs of the April 1975 Khmer Rouge
evacuation of Phnom Penh and the other cities of Cambodia. 5 In 1977,
publication of Ponchaud's Cambodge Ange Zero6 and John Barron and

Evan Luard, Speech Delivered at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights,
Geneva, Mar. 3, 1978, Foreign Policy Documents No. 25, Crown Copyright, 1978.
See also ECOSOC, U.N. Doc.E/CN.4/SR. 1466/Add. 1, (1978).
' Interview with Kenneth Quinn, Washington, D. C., (August 6, 199 1).
Cited in GEORGE C. HERRING, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR: THE UNITED STATES AND
2

VIETNAM 273 (1986). See also THE PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF MAY 26,
1975, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, VOLUME 1JANUARY ITo JUtY

17, 1975, at 641 (1977).
' Francois Ponchaud, Le CambodgeNeufMois Apres I- Un TravailGigantesque,LE
MONDE, Feb. 17, 1976, at 1; Francois Ponchaud, Le Cambodge NeufMois Apres llUn Noveau Type D 'homme, LE MONDE, Feb. 18, 1976 at 2.
6 FRANCOIS PONCHAUD, CAMBODGE ANtE ZERO (1977).
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Anthony Paul's Peace with Horror,7 both of which estimated that 1.2
million people had died since the communist victory, increased
awareness of alleged atrocities in Cambodia. Jean Lacouture's
influential review of Ponchaud's study in the March 1977 New York
Review of Books furthered this process. Lacouture asserted that; After
Auschwitz and the Gulag, we might have thought this century had
produced the ultimate in horror, but we are now seeing the suicide of
a people in the name of revolution, worse in the name of Socialism.8
Barron and Paul's work reached an enormous audience by its
partial serialization in Reader's Digest, where it was stated that
villages had turned to "charnel houses where unburied corpses lie
putrefying in the sun."9 Although the version of a nightmarish
Cambodia put forward by Ponchaud, Lacouture, Barron, and Paul was
questioned by the likes ofNoam Chomsky,'0 Hildebrand and Porter,"
and Malcolm Caldwell, 2 the views of such people became increasingly
marginalized as more information regarding Cambodian horrors
became available.
By 1977, one French journalist after discussing the disputed claims
as to the number of Cambodians who had died since the Communist
takeover asserted that, even taking into account the disparities in the
figures and the differences of opinion over what deaths are to be
blamed on the Khmer Rouge, the reality of the Cambodian nightmare
can no longer be questioned.' 3

7 JOHN BARRON AND ANTHONY PAUL, PEACE WITH HORROR: THE UNTOLD STORY
OF COMMUNIST GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA (1977).
8 Jean Lacouture, The Bloodiest Revolution, NEW YORK REviEw OF BOOKS, Vol.

XXIV, No. 9, May 1977, at 46.

" John Barron and Anthony Paul, Murderin a Gentle Land,READERS DIGEST, Feb.
1977, at 228.
10 Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, Distortionsat FourthHand,THE NATION,
June 1977, at 789-794 (book review).
" GEORGE HILDEBRAND AND GARETH PORTER, CAMBODIA: STARVATION AND
REVOLUTION
(1976).
12
Malcolm Caldwell, The CambodianDefence, THE GUARDIAN, May 8, 1978.
"3Stdphane Groueff, The Nation as ConcentrationCamp, NATIONAL REVIEW, Vol.

29, No. 34, Sept. 2, 1977, at 988-989.
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A similar statement was made by Martin Woollacott of the
Guardian,who had previously doubted the veracity of the atrocity
reports. "Even ifthe figures are wildly wrong," Woollacott wrote, "by
as much as 50 or 75 per cent, what remains still constitutes one of the
4
worst atrocities in this most brutal of centuries.'
Although Cambodia never became a major issue of concern to
Western governments during the 1975-1978 period, this emerging
consensus did pressure governments to act. In Britain, the Cambodia
issue was first broached in May 1976 by MP Patrick Wall, who cited
media reports that halfa million people had been condemned to death
and "everyone over the age of twelve and educated has been or will
be liquidated." Responding to Wall's call for Britain to raise the
Cambodian "genocide" in the U.N. as a threat to world peace,
Minister of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ted
Rowlands replied, While I, too, have read with great concern the
recent reports of events in Cambodia, I do not think they constitute a
threat to world peace. Nor, I should add, have I any means of
verifying the truth of allegations that have been made."
Two months later, however, when the same MP brought up the
same issue, the U.K. Minister of State asserted that, It is clear from
the considerable amount of information and evidence that has become
available that abuses and atrocities have occurred, although we cannot
16
accurately assess the scale of the abuses and atrocities.
Given the limitations of British intelligence capabilities regarding
Indochina," the difference between these two statements suggests the
important role played by press accounts.
Through 1977, a number of British MPs claimed made claims
similar to Wall's. 8 In March of that year, Under-Secretary Luard

SGUARDmN, Sept. 6, 1977.

15 Hansard,908 PareL. DEB., H.C. (5' ser.) 1398-1399
(1976).
16 Id., 914 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5' ser.) 1355-1356 (1976).

Letter from former senior official of British Foreign Office to author, name
withheld upon request, (May 3, 1994) (on file with author).
18 Hansard,929 PAnU. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 379-380 (1977); 938 PARL. DEB., H.C.
(5"' ser.) 651-652 (1977).
17
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responded in parliament that the official policy of the British
government was that Cambodia's actions were "primarily a domestic
matter and not a matter for the United Nations." Luard asserted,
however, that "if anything, it is a question for the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights, and I would be glad to see that body
discuss the matter."19 In November, Luard stated that the British
government was considering whether it could raise the matter at the
next meeting of the Commission.2 By December, as popular pressure
in the United Kingdom grew and all of the main churches of England
began to prepare a joint call to the government to aid the Cambodian
people, the Foreign Office announced that Britain would bring the
matter to the attention of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in
February 1978.21
A similar process took place across the Atlantic. Although the
Cambodia issue was only brought to the attention of the United States
Congress five times in 1976, each time, members of Congress added
press accounts of atrocities to the record. 2 Senator Pell asserted that,
I have been shocked to read the recent press accounts of
mass killings, forced evacuations from urban areas, and
generally brutal treatment of the Cambodian population by
the new regime... [If estimates of 1 million killed are] true,
approximately one fifth of the Cambodian population has
been annihilated - a record of barbarous butchery which is
surpassed in recent history only by the Nazi atrocities
against the Jews during World War II... I am amazed that
so little has been done to investigate and condemn what is
happening in Cambodia. The U.N. Human Rights
Commission has so far ignored the situation in that

19 Hansard,929 PAR. DEB., H.C. (5'"
ser.) 379-380 (1977).
20 Id., at 651-652.
21 Times, Dec. 13, 1977; Dec. 21, 1977.
22 CongressionalRecord,94th Congress, 2 d Session, Feb. 3, 1976, at 2056; Feb.
18,
1976, at 3697; Apr. 13, 1976, at 10681; May 6, 1976, at 12937.
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country.'3
In the executive branch as well, officials were beginning to take note
of the atrocity reports. In May 1976, National Security Adviser Brent
Scowcroft prepared for a congressman a long report on the Cambodia
situation, made up of what he called "authoritative journalistic
accounts of this period," including accounts from the New York Times,
Washington Post, and Time, as well as a translation of Ponchaud's
article from Le Monde.24
The U.S. Department of State was also gathering information,
particularly through its Bangkok embassy."5 State Department policy
was expressed in a confidential policy paper on human rights in
Cambodia from the Secretary of State. The Document stated that,
Department has taken following position regarding
growing numbers of press reports that large numbers of
Cambodians have died due to illness, starvation, or
execution since the present government took power a year
ago.
We share the concern about reported conditions in
Cambodia. The Secretary has spoken out publicly on the
suffering there. We are prepared to support any effective
action that might be taken to inquire further into the
question of violations of human rights in Cambodia.
The Cambodian authorities have almost completely
cut off access by foreigners to their country, and reports
of conditions in Cambodia are therefore difficult to verify.

23 Id., June 16, 1976, at 18617-18618.

Brent Scowcroft to Representative John J. Rhodes, The White House, May 29,
1976, Central Files, Gerald Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
25 HumanRights in Cambodia:HearingBefore the Subcommittee on International
Organizations, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on International
Relations,95thCong., I' Session, July 26, 1977 at 5. (According to Charles Twinings
testimony to Congress, only the United States, Australia, and Indonesia assigned
"Cambodia watchers" in their Bankok embassies).
24
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Information available to the [United States Government]
is not significantly different from that obtained by
journalists and comes primarily from refugees.
Nevertheless, these reports are too numerous to ignore
and sufficient information certainly exists for further
inquiry by appropriate international or private
humanitarian organizations.26
As the first paragraph makes clear, the State Department was
formulating its policy at least in part in response to press accounts.
The directive stated that "[s]hould any effort be undertaken by an
international organization, by a number of countries, or by nongovernmental organizations, we would be prepared to consider what
useful role we could play," and mentioned by name Amnesty
International and the International Commission of Jurists as such
organizations, as well as the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.
Special congressional hearings on the Cambodia situation were
held in 1977.27 Twenty-six statements on Cambodia were made in
congress the same year, many of which compared the Cambodia
situation to the Holocaust. 28 Richard Holbrooke, the Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, asserted in the
July 1977 hearing that,
We have concluded that the Cambodian authorities have
flagrantly and systematically violated the most basic
human rights. They have ordered or permitted extensive
26

Secretary of State to All East Asian and Pacific Diplomatic Posts, Paris, London,

New York, Bonn, Copenhagen, Geneva, Moscow, Brussels, Department of State

Telegram, June 8, 1976, FOIA No. 10015, released June 24, 1992. The Secretary's
statements refer to Kissinger's condemnation of the Cambodian communists
immediately following the takeover in April 1975.

27 Human Rights in Cambodia:HearingBefore the Subcommittee on International

Organizations, U.S. House of RepresentativesCommittee on International
Relations,95thCong., I' Session, July 26, 1977 at 5, supranote 25.
28 CongressionalRecord,95th Cong., I' Session, June 13, 1977, at 18667; July

12, 1977, at 22420; July 21, 1977, at 24497; Sept. 21, 1977, at 30251.
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killings; forcingly (sic) relocated the urban population;
brutally treated supporters of the previous government;
and suppressed personal and political freedoms."
At the end of the second hearing, Representative Stephen Solarz
sponsored a House resolution which referred to refugee accounts of
"countless killings and other barbaric brutalities by the Government of
Cambodia." Most significantly, it called upon the President,
to cooperate with other nations, through appropriate
international forums such as the United Nations, in an
effort to bring the flagrant violations of internationally
recognized human rights now taking place in Cambodia to
an end.30
A resolution containing virtually the same text passed the Senate in
November of the same year.31
This growing pressure to act corresponded with a dramatic change
in the American political landscape. Whereas the Ford Administration
had made the promotion of human rights abroad a rather low
priority," Jimmy Carter now spoke of "America's commitment to
human rights as a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy,"33 and
asserted that "[h]uman rights is the soul of our foreign policy -

29 Department of State Telegram, June 8, 1976, FOIA No. 10015,
released June24,

1992, supranote 26.

30 CongressionalRecord, 95th Cong., I' Session, July 25, 1977, at 24795; Sept. 27,

1977, at 31045-31046.

31 Id., Nov. 4, 1977, at
37093.
32RICHARD FALK, HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 12-14
(1981); Arthur
Schlessinger, Jr.,Human Rights and the HumanitarianTradition, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Vol. 57, No. 3, (Spring 1979), at 5 11-512; Daniel Patrick Moynihan, The Politicsof
Human Rights, COMMENTARY, Vol. 64, No. 2, (August 1977), at 19; WALTER
ISAACSON, KISSINGER: A BIOGRtAPHY (1992), at 653-672.
33 Jimmy Carter, Speech on Human Purposesin ForeignPolicy (1977),
in WALTER
LACQUER AND BARRY RuBiN, eds., THE HuMAN RIGHTS READER 307 (1979).
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because human rights is the very soul of our sense of nationhood. "'
Patricia Derian, appointed to fill the newly created post of Assistant
Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs,
reaffirmed Carter's activist approach to human rights in her claim that
"it is our obligation to work to obliterate human rights abuses
wherever they occur."35
For Carter, the traditional claim that countries were free to do as
they wished within their own borders was no longer entirely
legitimate. Carter asserted in a 1977 speech to the United Nations that
"no member of the United Nations can claim that mistreatment of its
citizens is solely its own business."36 The following year, he claimed
that,
The Universal Declaration [of Human Rights] means that
no nation can draw the cloak of sovereignty over torture,
disappearances, officially-sanctioned bigotry, or the
destruction of freedom within its own borders.37
Such claims created strong expectations of fulfillment.
Likely responding to such expectations, as well as to pressures
generated by congress and the media, Deputy Secretary of State
Warren Christopher stepped up U.S. official condemnations of
Cambodia in May 1977. Christopher called events in Cambodia
"among the most flagrant and massive abuses of human rights to be
found in the world today." 38 U.S. condemnation of the DK regime
further strengthened in April 1978, when President Carter sent a
statement to the Oslo Examination Commission of Cambodia Atrocity
34

Yimmy Carter, Speech on the ThirtiethAnniversary ofthe UniversalDeclaration

ofHuman Rights, id., at 328.
Cited inJOsHUAMURAvCHIK,

THE UNCERTAIN CRUSADE: JIMMY CARTER AND THE

DELEMMAS OF HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY 57 (1986).
36 Id. at 57.
37 Carter, supra note 34, at 326.

38 Wanen Christopher, Speech to National Media Conference, Wash., D.C., Jan.
18,
1978, in U.S. submission to U.N. COHR, July 6, 1978; U.S. Official Criticizes
Cambodia,NEW YORK TIMEs, Jan. 19, 1978.
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Reports meeting in Norway. Carter asserted:
America cannot avoid the responsibility to speak out in
condemnation of the Cambodian government, the worst
violator of human rights in the world today [emphasis
added]. Thousands of refugees from Cambodia have
accused their government of inflicting death on hundreds
of thousands of Cambodian people through the genocidal
policies it has implemented over the past three years.
Witnesses have recounted abuses that include mass
killings, inhuman treatment of the supporters of the
previous government, the forced deportation of urban
dwellers, and the total suppression of recognized political
and religious freedoms, as well as deprivation of food and
health care for the general population. Summary
executions continue in Cambodia today and fear of the
authorities is pervasive...
The American government again condemns the
abuses of human rights which have occurred in Cambodia.
It is an obligation of every member of the international
community to protest the policies of this or any nation
which cruelly and systematically violates the right of its
people to enjoy life and basic human dignities.39
This condemnation by the American president was covered widely in
40
the press.
If the allegations of mass killings in Cambodia were becoming ever
39 Statement by Jimmy Carter on Human Rights Violations in Cambodia, 14 Weekly

Comp. Press. Doe., 767-768 (Apr. 21, 1978), Submissionfrom the Government of
the UnitedStates ofAmerica UnderCommission on Human Rights Decision 9, U.N.
ESCOR, 31 st Sess., UN Do. E/CN.4/Sub.2/414 (1978); also Department of State
Bulletin (June 1978), at 38.
40GuARDIAN, Apr. 22, 1978; LE MONDE, Apr. 23-24, 1978; TIMEs, Apr. 24, 1978;
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23,1978; WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 22, 1978; Inside Cambodia,
CBS Evening News, Apr. 20-21, 1978, printed transcript produced by CBS News;
WASHINGTON POST, June 7, 1978; N.Y. TIMs, June 7,1978.
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more believed and Western governments were increasingly
condemning the DK regime, the question remained of what could be
done in response. As in Britain, paths of response in the U.S. led to
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. Secretary Christopher
claimed that in the process of "making human rights an important
concern of American foreign policy... We are playing an active part in
the work of the [UN] Human Rights Commission." ' Following his
January 1978 comment on the Cambodian abuses, Christopher stated
that the United States planned to support the British proposal to the
U.N. Commission.42
This policy was reflected in a State Department letter to the
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations outlining
United States action in response to human rights violations in
Cambodia. The letter described American policy as,
supporting efforts in the United Nations to bring increased
international attention to the Cambodian human rights
situation. We worked for the adoption of a resolution by
the Human Rights Commission which called upon the
Phnom Penh government to respond to allegations of
human rights violations. We intend to pursue efforts to
promote U.N. action during the August session of the
Human Rights Commission. 3
If three years of developing Western human rights responses to
41

Statement by Deputy Secretary of State Christopher before the Senate

Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY BAsIC Doc. 159,
at 407 (Mar. 7, 1977).
42 Christopher, supranote 38.
43 CondemningHumanRights Violations in Cambodia:Hearingbefore the Senate
Subcommittee on East Asian andPacificAffairs, Committee on ForeignRelations,
S. Rep. No.95-1166, 95th Cong., 2d Session (1978). (letter from Douglas J. Bennet,

Jr., Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations to Senator
John Sparkiman, Chairman Committee on Foreign Relations) The last sentence of the
quote refers to the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, which met in August.

78

BUFFALOJOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL L4W

[Vol.3

events in Cambodia were leading to the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights, the U.N. body itself was wholly unprepared for the
responsibility. Assessing the powers granted to the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights by its parent body, representatives at
the first meeting of the Commission in 1947 asserted that the
Commission had "no power to take any action in regard to any
complaints regarding human rights."" It was not until 1967 that the
Economic and Social Council gave the Human Rights Commission
any way of responding to alleged human rights violations when it
authorized the Commission and its Sub-Commission on the Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to "examine
gross violations of human rights and
information relevant to
45
freedoms..
fundamental
The procedure for receiving such information was only outlined
three years later when the "1503 procedure" allowed a working group
of the sub-Commission to review,
communications, together with replies from Governments,
if any, which appear to reveal a consistent pattern of gross
and reliably attested violations of human rights and
fundamental freedoms... [and] to prepare... a report
containing information on violations of human rights from
all available sources.'
Even if, after an investigation was carried out and a report was
issued confirming such a pattern, however, the most the Commission
could do was to condemn the violating state and refer the matter to
the Economic and Social Council.4 ' As one analyst of the United
Nations system for dealing with human rights abuses has noted,
44 U.N. Doe. E/259(1947), Paragraph 22.
45 ESCOR Res. 1235(XLII), U.N. ESCOR,
Doc. E/4393 (1967).

42

nd

Sess., Suppl. No. 1, at 17, U.N.

ESCORRes. 1503(XLVIII), U.N. ESCOR, 48' Sess., Suppl. No. IA, at 8, U.N.

Doe. E/4832/Add. 1 (1970).
47Id.
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The logic of this procedure ...is clear in the context of
the decentralized world legal order which is structured to
permit no meaningful interference with sovereign
prerogatives.""
In addition to such structural limitations, political maneuvering
also played a major role in the workings of the Commission . Not only
did various states use the Commission as a tool to accuse their
enemies of human rights violations, but members of collective
groupings of states were often able to deflect criticisms against them.49
Although the case of Uganda had been brought to the Commission in
1974, for example, consideration of the agenda item was delayed for
four years due largely to Idi Amin's position as head of the
Organization for African Unity.' ° Similarly, Socialist bloc, third world,
and non-aligned states were often able to shield themselves from
criticism by similar collective means,51 particularly after geographical
distribution quotas increased the representation of third world states
in 1967.52 In this politicized forum, issues such as de-colonization,
apartheid,and Chilean and Israeli violations had become an almost
exclusive enforcement priority.53
As this process of bringing the Cambodia issue to the flawed U.N.
body responsible for human rights developed, however, other events
conspired to undermine even so limited a response. By the time Luard
addressed the U.N. Commission in Geneva in 1978, the political

48 Eric LaneMassKillings by Governments: Lawful in the World Legal Order?,21

N.Y.U.J. INT'L. L. & POL., 273 (1979).

49 Philip Aston, CriticalAppraisal of the U.N. Human Rights Regime, in PHILIP
ALSTON, ed., THEUNIED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 163

1992).

0 Id.at 149; see alsoTom J.Farer and Felice Gaer, The U.N. andHumanRights: At
the End Of the Beginning, in ADAM ROBERTS AND BENEDICr KINGSBURY, eds.
UNrED
NATIONS, DIVIDED WORLD 280 (Second edition, 1993).
51
RIcHARDL JACKSON, THE NON-ALIGNED, THE U.N., AND THE SUPERPOWERS 106
1983).
HOWARD TOLLEY, THE U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 188 (1987).

Id. at 63-64.
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landscape was already changing. From the time of the communist
victories in Cambodia and Vietnam in April 1975, tensions between
the two communist states had mounted. In later 1975, clashes
occurred between the two regimes on the disputed islands of Tho Chu
and Phu Quoc.' By 1977, armed clashes were taking place across the
Cambodian-Vietnamese border, leading to the limited Vietnamese
invasion at the end of that year. 5 At the same time, as Cambodia
moved towards closer relations with China, Vietnam was moving
closer to China's rival for influence in Southeast Asia, the USSR.
While the United States proclaimed its neutrality in this conflict, its
movement towards establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC
suggested otherwise."'
If the United States was establishing closer ties to China, a move
perceived by the Soviet Union as hostile,5 7 then it could be implied
that Washington had an interest in preferring China's ally in Indochina,
Cambodia, to the USSR's regional client, Vietnam. As the Far
EasternEconomic Review noted in late 1978,
Like Australia, both Japan and the US are repelled by the
violations of human rights which they allege are taking
place in Cambodia, but regional 'balance of power' politics
oblige them to see that Cambodia is preserved as an
independent state, free from Vietnamese domination."
Before the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia of 25 December
1978, the two very different strands of Western policy towards
Cambodia could exist side by side. The U.S. could seek closer
relations with China on one hand and condemn the PRC's allies in
Democratic Kampuchea for violations of huiman rights on the other.

54 Stephen Heder, The Kampuchean-Vietnamese Conflict, in DAVID W. P. ELLioTr,

ed. THE THIRD INDocHINA CONricT 28-29 (198 1).

55 NAYAN CHANDA, BROTHER ENEMY 206-207 (1986).
56 GRANT EvANs AND KEVIN ROWLEY, RED BROTHERHOOD AT WAR 159
(1984).
57JIMMY CARTER, KEEPING FArm: MEMOIRS OF A PIREsmEwr
234 (1982).
59 See generally FAR EASTER ECONOMIC REViEw, Nov. 10,
1978.
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This was so for a number of reasons. First, the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights was a body recognized as ineffective. Even if it had
attempted to do so, the Commission could not have weakened
significantly the internationally isolated Democratic Kampuchea
regime. Thus, there was little political cost to Britain and the United
States in acting through the U.N. body. Second, the strategic
considerations which implied support for the DK regime had not been
cemented so firmly by March 1978 as to demand such support. Even
though the United States was fast improving its relations with China,
relations had not yet reached a level where each state would have to
support the actions of the other in all cases where the Soviet Union
was involved. Third, the Carter administration was itself coming to
terms with the potential conflict between its stated human rights
principles and the demands of America's strategic interests.
For this reason, the United States' support for Luard's March 1978
resolution in the U.N. Commission on Human Rights was not so
difficult an issue. The British resolution, co-sponsored by Sweden and
Austria, requested that a special rapporteur be designated to carry out
a "thorough study of the human rights situation in Democratic
Kampuchea." 9 Expressing opposition to the resolution, the Soviet
delegate accused the United States and its allies of presenting "biased
information" and of using the slogan "protection of human rights" in
its campaign to undermine "the prestige of the USSR and other
Socialist states."' Due to the opposition of the Soviet Union,
Yugoslavia, and Syria, a compromise solution was negotiated by the
Indian representative whereby a resolution calling for the rapporteur's
report to be ready for the thirty-fifth session of the Commission a year

59 Question of the Violation ofHuman Rights andFundamentalFreedoms in
Any

Part of the World, With ParticularReference to Colonialand Other Dependent
Countiesand Teritories,U.N. ESCOR, 34th Sess., Agenda Item 12, at 1, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/L. 1404 (1978).
60 Commission on Human Rights: Summary Record of the 1469th Meeting,U.N.
ESCOR, 34th Sess., at 9, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/SR. 1469; Commission on Human
Rights: Summary Recordof the 1473rdMeeting,
U.N. ESCOR, 34th Sess., at 9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR. 1473, (1978).
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later was adopted without vote. 61
The Commission delegated the task of writing the report to its
Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities. To provide the Sub-Commission with the necessary
information, the United States, Britain, Canada, Norway, Amnesty
International, and the International Commission of Jurists submitted
a total of 997 pages of testimony.62 The 667 page U.S. report
represented the summation of information on the Cambodian abuses
collected over the past three and a half years. The document included
excerpts from twenty-two interviews with refugees conducted by
personnel from the U.S. embassy in Bangkok, extracts from twelve
earlier reports from the American Embassy in Bangkok, a copy of
President Carter's statement to the participants at Oslo and Warren
Christopher's January statement, transcripts of the 1977 congressional
hearings and of two House resolutions condemning Cambodia, as well
as full copies of Ponchaud's and Barron and Paul's books. 63 Some
refugee testimonies claimed that up to three million Cambodians had
been killed since 1975." One asserted that,
I doubt that more than one third of the Cambodians are
still alive... All of the new Cambodians are being
eliminated, Buddhists, intellectuals, anti-Communists as
well as former soldiers, students and government officials,
everyone even remotely associated with the former regime
[are being killed]. 6
The 59 page British report to the Commission included a copy of
61

U.N. ESCOR, 34th Sess., Suppl. No. 4, Res. 9 (XXXIV), U.N. Doe. ElI 978/34,

E/CN.4/1292, (1978).
62 Submission from the Government of the United States of America under
Commission on Human Rights, Decision 9, U.N. ESCOR, 31st Sess., U.N. Doe.

E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/414/Add. 4 (1978).
63
64

65

Id. at 5.

Id. at Section 1.

Id. at 7.(Excerpts from this document were printed in the N.Y. TnvEs on Aug. 30,
1978).
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Evan Luard's March speech and twelve refugee accounts which
examined different aspects of life in Cambodia. One refugee concluded
that "millions of Cambodians" had died as a result of the revolution.'
Another warned that "if the world just close their eyes to all this
' The
misery, it is a certainty that the Khmer race will disappear."67
report noted that the refugee accounts were "so numerous and so
consistent and mutually corroborative, that it is not possible to doubt
their general truth,"6 and concluded that "the most fundamental
articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights have been
'
grossly violated in Democratic Kampuchea."69
While the government of Democratic Kampuchea had not
presented its position formally to the Commission , the subCommission decided to utilize as Phnom Penh's defense a U.N.
general distribution document submitted by DK foreign minister Ieng
Sary in April 1978. The letter claimed that since the "liberation" of
Cambodia,
the propaganda machine of the imperialists, expansionists,
and annexationists has raised what it calls the 'human
rights' issue in its slander and denigration of Democratic
Kampuchea... [and] have conducted their campaign of
denigration against the people of Kampuchea ever since
the latter rose up in defiance of their domination,
oppression, and exploitation. 0
Human Rights Violations in Democratic Kampuchea, United Kingdom
Government, Foreign Policy Documents No. 25, Annex 2, at 13 (July 14, 1978).
67 Id., Annex 1, at 5.
68 Id., Introduction, at 1.
69 Id., Introduction, at 9. (This document was released by the British government in
September and received significant attention in the press. See TIMEs, Sept. 22, 1978;
LEMONDE, Dec. 23, 1978; WASHmNGTON POST, Sept. 21, 1978; TIME, Oct. 2, 1978).
70 Question of the Violation ofHuman Rights andFundamentalFreedoms in
Any
66

Part of the World, With ParticularReference to Colonial and Other Dependent

Countriesand Territories,Note by the Secretary General,U.N. ESCOR, 35th Sess.,
Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,
31st Sess., at 1U.N. Doe. EICN.4/Sub.2/418 (1978).
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It told of the "extremely cruel, barbaric, and destructive war of
aggression against Kampuchea" by "American imperialists, with the
active participation of British imperialists," whose,
criminal hands are stained with the blood of several million
persons, they continue their virulent calumny and
denigration of the peoples and countries which fought
against them. In all these crimes, the British colonialists
and imperialists displayed the greatest cruelty and
treachery... the British government.., is at present acting
as spokesman for all the imperialists, the old and new
colonialists, the expansionists, annexationists and
reactionaries in attacking the new society in Kampuchea,
to which the people of Kampuchea is deeply attached...
The British government represents the British colonialist
and imperialist regime, which is known as the most
infamous and abject in the history of mankind... The world
is perfectly aware that, at present, in England, the British
imperialists and capitalist monopolists live in opulence on
the heaps of corpses of the people whom they have
plundered, exploited, and oppressed for centuries... Such
are 'human rights' made in England... The British
government has no right to interfere in the internal affairs
of Democratic Kampuchea.""
This attack on Britain would stand in sharp contrast to later words of
praise by representatives of Democratic Kampuchea once the
changing international context found the Pol Pot regime and Western
governments on the same side in the U.N.
The Democratic Kampuchea document described the new
Cambodia in which all people were equal, and society was just and
democratic. In response to the accusations of mass murder, the

71

Id.at 2-4.
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Kampucheans responded that,
There is no reason for the Government of Kampuchea to
reduce the population or to maintain it at its current level,
since today's population of 8 million is well below the
potential of the country, which needs more than 20
million. Accordingly, the goal of the Government of
Democratic Kampuchea is to increase the population as
quickly as possible.72
This single document from Democratic Kampuchea clearly did not
constitute a substantial counterweight to the nearly thousand pages
submitted to the Commission by Western governments and agencies.
When the rapporteur's report did come to the Commission the
following year, however, the situation was much changed. Vietnam
had ousted the Democratic Kampuchea regime and now threatened
America's ally, Thailand. The Soviet Union under Brezhnev had
signed a twenty-five year treaty of friendship and cooperation with
Vietnam,73 and seemed to be making gains by aggressive action in
Indochina, the horn of Africa, Cuba, and elsewhere. 74 The U.S. and
China had established official relations in January 1979, an event of
wide-ranging significance. 7' The Chinese had attacked Vietnam's
northern border in February 1979, a move to which Washington
seemed to acquiesce.76 The ousted Cambodian regime was fighting for
its life along the Thai-Cambodia border and for its continued political
72 Id. at 7.
73 Treaty ofFriendshipand CooperationBetween the SocialistRepublic of Vietnam

andthe Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics, VmTAM CouRIER, Dec. 1978, Article
14 at 4.
RAYMOND L. GARTHoFF, DATENm AND CONFRONTATION: AMERICAN-SOvIET
RELATIONS FROM NIXON TO REAGAN 617-618, 623-653 (1985).
75 CARTER, supra, note 57, at 194-195; ZBIGNmW BRzzINsKI, POWER AND
PRINCPLE: MEMOIRS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER 1977-1981,228 (1983).
761d, CARTER at 206, BRzEzINsKI at 410-411; Reply by the Assistantto the President
forNationalSecuriiAffairs,AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY BASIC DOCUMENTs 1977-

1980, Doe. 597, 1109.
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representation in the United Nations. In sum, the CambodianVietnamese conflict had become inextricably linked to the Sino-Soviet
dispute and the Cold War.
Following the invasion, the Vietnamese-installed People's Republic
of Kampuchea (PRK) regime asserted its claim to be the sole,
legitimate representative of Cambodia. As the DK regime was making
similar claims, and, in the U.N. at least, with rather more success, the
PRK moved to undermine the DK by exposing its despicable human
rights record. The PRK claimed that three million people had been
killed by the DK and continually reported on the unearthing of mass
graves." In August 1979, a genocide tribunal met in Phnom Penh
where the panel of judges found the defendants guilty of
"committ[ing] mass killings.., which are in some aspects more
barbarous than those used by the Hitlerite fascists.""8 The judges
confirmed the estimate of three million persons killed by the "Pol PotIeng Sary clique,"' and condemned Pol Pot and Ieng Sary to death in
absentia."
In response to such allegations, and in attempt to neutralize
Vietnamese/PRK accusations against it, the DK accused the new
regime of sowing a genocidal famine designed to wipe out the
Cambodian people. The Democratic Kampuchea representative to the
U.N. responded to Eastern bloc accusations of genocide against it by
claiming that by sowing famine the Vietnamese,
have committed crimes of genocide worse than those of
Hitler Nazism in order to annihilate the nation and people
of Kampuchea and the national identity of Kampuchea. 8
77 SPK, Jan. 26, 1979, FBIS, Jan. 29, 1979, at h3; SPK, Feb. 23, 1979, FBIS,
Feb.

27, 1979, at h4.
78 People's Revolutionary Tribunal Held in Phnom Penh for the Trial of the
Genocide Crime of the PolPot-JengSary Clique, DocUMENTs 301 (1990).
79 Id. at 301.

80 Id. at 31. See alsoU.N. General Assembly, General Distribution, U.N. Doc.
A/34/49 1, Sept. 20, 1979; FAR EAsTERN ECONOMIC REviEw, Aug. 31, 1979; NEW

Tnjms No. 37, Sept. 1979.
81 P.V.100, 1724 (Vol.11 1.A/33/PV.77-80), May 24, 1979.
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Such accusations were constantly repeated by representatives of
Democratic Kampuchea.' The Chinese made similar claims, accusing
Vietnam of treating Cambodians in ways which could "only be
compared to the genocidal atrocities perpetuated by Hitler fascism... 3
These accusations played an important role in influencing Western
perceptions of the situation in Cambodia. As the American U.N.
ambassador asserted in explaining his country's vote for the continued
representation of the DK,
Our position on the technical question of credentials in no
way implies any degree of support or recognition of the
Pol Pot regime itself, or approval of its atrocious
practices... We condemn and abhor the brutal human
rights violations which have taken place in Kampuchea...
However, the so-called Heng Samrin regime, both because
it was imposed by the Vietnamese military force on the
Khmer people, and because of its treatment of the Khmer
people, is also open to condemnation. One indication of
the regime's cruel attitude towards the Khmer people is
the serious threat of famine which affects over two million
people and the obstacles which that regime continues to
pose to our effective international relief effort.84
If both the DK and the PRK regime were guilty of mass abuses against
the Cambodian people and there was no moral difference between the
two regimes, then the vote on representation could be a vote on a
technical matter, not a consideration of genocide.8"
In this highly politicized environment, condemning the now

82

See

VOICE OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPtCHEA, June

6, 1979, FBIS, June 14, 1979, at

h8; Aug. 2, 1979, FBIS, Aug. 13, 1979, at h4; BEIJING REVIEW, Vol. 22, No. 37,
Sept.14, 1979, at 19.
83 BEIJING REviEw, Vol. 22, No. 28, July 13,1979, at 24.
84 U.N. Doe. A/34/PV.4, 50 (1979).
85 Id. at 50. (Austria, France, and Sweden abstained in the 1979 credentials vote).
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deposed Democratic Kampuchea regime had an entirely different
meaning than it did prior to the invasion. Before the invasion,
condemning the DK abuses cost Western states little and addressed
the pressures being put on governments by concerned citizens and
legislators. Condemning the same regime after the invasion, however,
threatened to play into the anti-DK propaganda campaign of the
Vietnamese and the PRK, to undermine the policy of opposing the
Vietnamese move on all levels, to antagonize the ASEAN states
promoting the continued representation of the DK in the UN, and to
drive a wedge between the United States and China just as relations
between the two countries were improving. It was in this context that
the Cambodia issue returned to the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights in 1979.
The report called for at the Commission's 1978 meeting, prepared
by Abdelwahab Bouhdiba, the Algerian chairman of the Commission's
Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
ofMinorities, was presented to the Commission in March 1979. The
report, based on the thousand pages of evidence presented to the
Commission in 1978, went through most of the articles of the
Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, describing allegations of how
each had been violated by the Democratic Kampuchea authorities. It
asserted, for example, that the right to life, liberty and security of
person described in Article 3 of the charter had been violated as,
a large number of former military officers, senior officials,
policemen, intelligence agents, country officials and
military police were executed in various parts of the
country as part of a systematic campaign of extermination,
and.., in a very large number of cases the wives and
children of such categories of persons were also
executed... [Many additional deaths came] as a result of
being forced to perform exhausting manual labor under a
strict regime, without being provided with sufficient food,
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rest or medical care. 6
The report described the absence of any sort ofjudicial process or free
expression and the execution of religious leaders."
The Democratic Kampuchean version of the human rights
situation in Cambodia was expressed in a telegram from Ieng Sary to
the sub-Commission dated 16 September 1978, before the Pol Pot
regime had been ousted. In language characteristic of the Democratic
Kampuchea authorities prior to their removal from power, Sary
accused the Sub-Commission of lending its support to those,
who after committing immeasurable crimes against the
people of Kampuchea... continue to defame Democratic
Kampuchea to whitewash their crimes. 8
"The Government of Democratic Kampuchea," Sary declared, "does
not murder, as the imperialists, expansionists and annexationists with
their slander and calumny, have tried to make people believe."89
Although sub-Commission chairman Bouhdiba had been required
to present both sides in the text, he was under no such constraint in his
verbal presentation to the Commission . Bouhdiba asserted that in a
"systematic massacre,"
at least 100,000 persons had been executed and that at
least I million had died as a result of lack of food or care,
physical exhaustion brought about by the extremely severe
labour regime that had been imposed."
Using Jean Lacouture's words from the New York Review of Books,
Bouhdiba described the Kampuchean actions as "constitut[ing]
86 U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/1335, 10 (1979).
87 Id.at 6-19.
88 Id. at 23.
89 Id. at 23.

90 U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/SR. 1510,6 (Mar. 1979).
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nothing less than autogenocide," and stated that the abuses described
in the documents were "the most serious that had occurred anywhere
in the world since Nazism." 91
Despite Bouhdiba's plea that it was "neither possible nor prudent
to pass over [the allegations] in silence or simply lay the matter
aside," such dispassionate consideration based solely on principles
of human rights was impossible in the highly politicized Commission.
In spite of the opposition of the United States, France, Britain, and
other Western states, a Yugoslav resolution to postpone discussion of
the report for another year was accepted by a large majority which
included the ASEAN representatives. This postponement on the
grounds that it was impossible to discuss the atrocity reports without
' (i.e. the Vietnamese
touching on the "broader political situation"93
invasion of Cambodia) was essentially a concession to the DK regime.
Although the Soviet support for the Yugoslav proposal ran counter to
its attempts elsewhere to present the Pol Pot regime in a negative
light, the principle of not supporting the "interference in the internal
affairs" of states in the name of human rights was likely considered
paramount. 94
More surprising, however, was the willingness of the Western
states to drop the issue of the report after their initial protest. The
United States and Britain had referred to their submissions to the
Commission during the post-invasion U.N. debates as evidence of
their condemnation of Democratic Kampuchean abuses even as they
supported the DK's continued representation. If this had been a
meaningful point, then it seems that those governments would have
made a stronger and more public argument against the shelving of the
report for a further year. No public statements were made on the

91 Id. at 7.

92 Id. at. 7.
93

U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR. 1516,34 (Mar. 1979). Decision was E/1 979/36

E/CN.4/1347), Decision 6(XXXV).

U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/SR. 1519, 6. (It should be remembered that Western states,

particularly the USA were criticizing the Soviet Union over its internal human rights

record at this time. CARTER, supra,note 57, at 144-150.
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matter, nor was it brought up by either government in the Security
Council or General Assembly. While bringing the issue of human
rights abuses in Democratic Kampuchea to the attention of the
Commission on Human Rights had been relatively painless in 1978,
pushing the issue of DK abuses now pushed against to the flow of
Western policies towards Cambodia. Further, such actions risked
supporting a propaganda campaign by the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and
the People's Republic of Kampuchea to use the DK "genocide" in
Cambodia for political ends, even ifthis campaign was based on actual
events of the past three and a half years. The ambiguities and
contradictions inherent in the policies of western states were also
made clear in the developing refugee situation and alleged famine in
Kampuchea.
By later-1979, the outline of the border system was becoming
clear. Different factions were taking control of border camps and
building political, social, and military structures around the
Cambodians stranded at the border. Kept alive by Western food aid
and armed with Chinese weapons delivered by the Thai military, the
border factions fast developed an identity of opposition. While the DK
was by far the most significant of these groups, Son Sann's Khmer
People's National Liberation Front, Sihanouk's Moulinaka, and other
smaller groupings developed as well.9" With foreign aid and arms, the
myth of a legitimate resistance put forward in the 1979 U.N.
representation vote was gradually transformed into a reality.
At the same time, the PRK and Vietnamese seemed to be losing
the propaganda battle. Western press accounts lambasted the new
regime for failing to distribute donated rice as Cambodians in the
interior were allegedly starving.' The Vietnamese military's
threatening posture along the Thai border also caused great concern
in Washington as well as Bangkok. In response, the U.S. began a

95 Briefing Material From the Office of the Khmer Emergency Group
As of

February1980, U.S. Embassy, Bangkok, Thailand; see also JUSTIN CORNFIELD, A
STORY OF THE CAMBODIAN NON-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE, 1975-1983 (1991).
OBSERVER, Oct. 4, 1979; GUARDIAN, Nov. 12, 1979.
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massive shipment of arms to Thailand and many of its ASEAN allies.97
While arming the Thais was a defensive move, offensive measures
were also taken. Western states, China, and ASEAN now had a clear
interest in making the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia as costly
as possible by supporting the only truly legitimate opposition
movement along the Thai-Cambodian border - the DK. Given that the
DK resistance was already so weakened by its military failures, the
poor health condition of its civilian base, and its negative international
reputation, Western states and others now hesitated to further weaken
and isolate the already vulnerable regime by harking on its human
rights record. The newfound common interests of Western states and
the DK regime was evidenced in a number of fora.
In the U.N. Security Council, following the 1979 vote to proceed
with the DK representatives seated, in which the Western states had
voted with China for the DK, the Pol Pot regime presented a different
view than it had in its condemnation of the British "imperialists" the
year before. In sharp contrast, DK Ambassador Thiounn Prasith now
stated that,
My delegation would like to pay a sincere tribute to the
United States of America, France, Norway, Portugal, and
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, which have shown their deep sympathy for the
struggle of the people of Kampuchea, their condemnation
of the Vietnamese aggression against and invasion of
Democratic Kampuchea, and their support for a
democratic, independent and sovereign Kampuchea with
its territorial integrity."
Clearly, divisions which had characterized relations between the
Democratic Kampuchea regime and Western states during the 19751978 period, when human rights considerations had been of

97BANGKOK WORLD, June 24, 1980; N.Y. TIMEs,
98 U.N. Doe. S/PV.2112,27 (1979).

July 1, 1980.
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comparatively greater importance to Western states, were lessening
as different values gained in relative stature following the Vietnamese
invasion.
This shift was also clear in the 1980 session of the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights. In the Security Council debates of
1979, United States officials had asserted that the representation issue
should be considered separate from the human rights issue, which
could be addressed elsewhere, implying the Commission on Human
Rights." Similarly, the British Lord Privy Seal, Sir Ian Gilmour, had
responded to criticisms in the House of Commons of the British vote
to seat the Democratic Kampuchea regime by asserting that,
We intend.., to do anything we can to ensure that the
considerations of human rights in Cambodia does not lapse
in the Human Rights Commission."
When the Commission met in March 1980, therefore, its deliberations
represented perhaps the last place where the human rights record of
the Democratic Kampuchean government might have been considered
in strictly human rights terms.
The proposed 1980 resolution, which Britain co-sponsored,
however, almost completely ignored the Bouhdiba report and the
focus of the Commission's earlier deliberations. Indeed, the only
phrase which included any reference to abuses perpetrated by the DK
regime asserted, somewhat disingenuously, that the Commission,
"[c]ondemns all the gross and flagrant violations of human rights
10
which have occurred in Kampuchea."°
By grouping the Democratic Kampuchea abuses with those
alleged to have taken place under the new regime, the Commission
was relativizing the two competing sets of accusations in a manner
consistent with the Chinese and DK propaganda campaign to do the
99 U.N. Doe. S/PV.2110,7 (1979).
100 Hansard, PARI. DEB. H.C., Vol. 975, 723.
101 Resolution 29(XXXVI)Commission on Human Rights Report on the 36th
Session, U.N. Doe. ElI 980/13, E/CN.4/1408, 1575th Meeting, 190-191 (1980).
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same. The Chinese representative to the Commission stated in the
debate that Vietnam was carrying out genocide in Kampuchea by
destroying crops, sabotaging international aid, mining rice fields, and
using poison gas and chemical weapons. 2 The British representative
asserted similarly that the acts of the Heng Samrin regime were of a
"very similar nature" to those of the Democratic Kampuchea
regime.'l 3
The title of the 1980 resolution, "The Situation in Democratic
Kampuchea," indicated its connection to past deliberations in the
Commission on Human Rights under the same agenda title. The actual
resolution, however, seemed to have more in common with the
agenda item entitled "The Situation in Kampuchea" which had passed
the General Assembly in November 1979 in response to the
Vietnamese invasion 1' 4 than it did with the series of events in the
human rights Commission leading to the Bouhdiba report. The
preamble stated,
Noting with deep concern that in January 1979
Democratic Kampuchea was invaded by foreign forces,
leading to further human suffering [italics added]
including a large-scale exodus of refugees,
Recalling further General Assembly Resolution
34/22 of 14 November 1979 on the situation in
Kampuchea which called on the parties to the conflict to
cease all hostilities forthwith and for the immediate
withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kampuchea,
Seriously concerned that Kampuchea is still under
foreign occupation and that the conflict continues, thus
preventing the people of Kampuchea from exercising their
right to self-determination."0 5

102 Id. at 297.

Id. at 286.
U.N. Doe. A/34/PV.67, 1287 (1979).
105 Supra,note 101.
103
104
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That the focus of the 1980 resolution was opposition to the
Vietnamese invasion rather than any condemnation of the DK regime
was made even more evident by the paragraphs asserting that the
Commission,
Condemns further the invasion and occupation of
parts ofKampuchea by foreign forces and the violations of
human rights which have ensued...
Urges the parties to observe fully the fundamental
principles of human rights and... [inter alia] Ensure the
adequate supply and distribution of food and medical care
to the civilian population, and non-interference with all
activities which are essential for the survival of the civilian
population. U6
In an odd reversal of roles, the Soviet Union and its allies, who
had in 1978 opposed the decision to commission the Bouhdiba report
in the first place, now expressed their full support for the report. A
Soviet bloc draft resolution asserted that it,
Notes with appreciation the... [Bouhdiba report]
and condemns the revealed flagrant and mass violations of
human rights and fundamental freedoms in Democratic
10 7
Kampuchea.
In the debate, the Bulgarian representative called the Western states'
criticisms of the PRK "insincere and politically motivated."'0 8 Cuba
claimed that facts were being twisted to "suit certain special
interests,"" ° and the Soviet Union that the UK/ASEAN draft
constituted interference in the internal affairs of Kampuchea."'
106 Id.
107 U.N. Doc. EICN.4/L. 1524, (1980).
108 Supra,note 103, at 284.
109 Id.at 288.

110 Id. at 290.
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Despite these strong objections of the Soviet bloc states, the
UK/ASEAN resolution passed by a 20-9-6 vote, with all of the
Western and ASEAN states supporting its adoption."' The Soviet
draft resolution was defeated by a similar margin.
The reception of this decision by the opposing parties
demonstrated the complete transformation of the agenda item from a
virtual indictment of the Democratic Kampuchea regime and an
outgrowth of public condemnation of DK atrocities in the West to an
additional lever being used to oppose the Vietnamese invasion of
Cambodia. The DK observer at the Commission warmly welcomed its
adoption. 1 The PRK news agency SPK, on the other hand, quoted
Nhan Dan that,
The resolution of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
does nothing but serve the interests of the imperialists, the
reactionaries of Peking and the other reactionary forces,
and reduces the prestige of the United Nations. It has no
value." 3
In the large and complex struggle over the fate of Cambodia, the
resolution did indeed have value. While the human rights issue had
been perhaps the issue of most significance for Western states in the
period after the American withdrawal from Indochina in 1975, when
such concerns could be considered separate from strategic and other
interests, the resolution demonstrated that this had now clearly
changed. Now, the human rights issue, turned on its head, became a
further tool to wage the battle against the extension of Vietnamese
and, therefore, Soviet influence in Southeast Asia. Human rights was
one area where the condemnation of the Vietnamese could partially
neutralize the accusations being made against Democratic
Kampuchea. Open support for the DK would be extremely
problematic in terms of public opinion in the West if the DK was
III Id. at86, 101.

112 Id. at 307; see also U.N. Doe. E/1 980/C.2/SR.20 (1980).
113
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branded a pariah regime ousted by a more acceptable neighbor. No
such consideration was necessary if the conflict was between two
pariah regimes.
As was clear from the 1980 resolution, the human rights prong of
the foreign policies of Western states which had existed in the 19751978 years had now been clearly subjugated to the strategic and geopolitical interest of opposing the Vietnamese and Soviets in every way
possible.1 1 4 The U.N. Commission on Human Rights, designed as a
forum for the promotion of human rights, had instead become a forum
in which the illusory nature of such lofty principles was made
abundantly clear.
As the pinnacle of U.N. structures for the promotion and
protection of human rights, the Commission did indeed bear, in
Luard's words, a "unique responsibility." The Commission was the
body to which concerned governments went once media reports and
public and legislative pressure had convinced them to act. Rather than
providing a forum where such concerns could be translated into
responsive action, the Commission served more as a black hole,
sucking in the best energies of concerned observers and emitting little
or nothing in return. While the Cambodia episode demonstrated in
high relief the failure of the institution of the Commission on Human
Rights, this was ultimately the failure of states.
The states which brought the DK abuses to the Commission in
1978 were the same states who had designed the Commission to have
little real power. After the Vietnamese invasion, many of those same
states prevented the Commission from using what little authority it
had to condemn the DK abuses. This failure of states to address so
wide-scale a violation as that perpetrated by the DK regime thus
brings into question the oft-stated commitment of states, particularly
those in the West, to human rights principles.
Perhaps it is not surprising that states act, as they always have
114 This policy would continue, with minor adjustments, at least until 1990, when the

Vietnamese had withdrawn from Cambodia and the Cold War was drawing to a close.
Only then did the United States withdraw its support from the DK-led Coalition
Government of Democratic Kampuchea in the U.N.
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done, to promote their geo-strategic interests. What is somewhat
startling, however, is the vast gulf, as seen in the case of Cambodia,
between the moralistic rhetoric states use to justify their actions and
the realpolitik-style decisions which complexities of world politics
thrust upon them.
If states choose to hide behind the cloak of inviolable sovereignty
and specific state interest and not address mass violations of human
rights wherever they occur, as is their right, then failures to address
such violations in places like Cambodia, Rwanda, and Bosnia will have
to be accepted. If they wish to create a system in which such abuses
can be addressed or even prevented, then institutions will need to be
developed which allow this to happen. As the case of Cambodia
shows, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights is not such an
institution.

